How Did Ontario Pulp and Paper Producers Respond to Effluent Regulations, 1985-89? by Fearnley, Joan et al.
Série Scientifique
Scientific Series
Montréal
Octobre 1996
96s-25
How Did Ontario Pulp and Paper
Producers Respond to Effluent
Regulations, 1985-89?
Paul Lanoie, Mark Thomas,
Joan Fearnley
Ce document est publié dans lintention de rendre accessibles les résultats préliminaires de la
recherche effectuée au CIRANO, afin de susciter des échanges et des suggestions. Les idées et les
opinions émises sont sous lunique responsabilité des auteurs, et ne représentent pas
nécessairement les positions du CIRANO ou de ses partenaires.
This paper presents preliminary research carried out at CIRANO and aims to encourage
discussion and comment. The observations and viewpoints expressed are the sole
responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of CIRANO or its
partners.
CIRANO
Le CIRANO est une corporation privée à but non lucratif constituée en vertu de la Loi des
compagnies du Québec. Le financement de son infrastructure et de ses activités de recherche
provient des cotisations de ses organisations-membres, dune subvention dinfrastructure du
ministère de lIndustrie, du Commerce, de la Science et de la Technologie, de même que des
subventions et mandats obtenus par ses équipes de recherche. La Série Scientifique est la
réalisation dune des missions que sest données le CIRANO, soit de développer lanalyse
scientifique des organisations et des comportements stratégiques.
CIRANO is a private non-profit organization incorporated under the Québec Companies
Act. Its infrastructure and research activities are funded through fees paid by member
organizations, an infrastructure grant from the Ministère de lIndustrie, du Commerce, de
la Science et de la Technologie, and grants and research mandates obtained by its
research teams. The Scientific Series fulfils one of the missions of CIRANO: to develop the
scientific analysis of organizations and strategic behaviour.
Les organisations-partenaires / The Partner Organizations
École des Hautes Études Commerciales.
École Polytechnique.
McGill University.
Université de Montréal.
Université du Québec à Montréal.
Université Laval.
MEQ.
MICST.
Avenor.
Banque Nationale du Canada
Bell Québec.
Fédération des caisses populaires de Montréal et de lOuest-du-Québec.
Hydro-Québec.
La Caisse de dépôt et de placement du Québec.
Raymond, Chabot, Martin, Paré
Société délectrolyse et de chimie Alcan Ltée.
Téléglobe Canada.
Ville de Montréal.
ISSN 1198-8177
Correspondence Address: Paul Lanoie, CIRANO, 2020 University Street, 25th floor,*
Montréal, Qc, Canada H3A 2A5 Tel: (514) 985-4020 Fax: (514) 985-4039 e-mail:
lanoiep@cirano.umontreal.ca
We would like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments on a first version of this paper.
École des Hautes Études Commerciales and CIRANO
Princeton University
École des Hautes Études Commerciales§
How Did Ontario Pulp and Paper
Producers Respond to Effluent
Regulations, 1985-89?*
Paul Lanoie , Mark Thomas , Joan Fearnley  §
Résumé / Abstract
Cet article explore les effets de la réglementation des émissions de
polluants sur les firmes de lindustrie ontarienne des pâtes et papier. Le modèle
utilise des variables instrumentales pour faire la distinction entre les effets liés
à la * capture + de lagence de réglementation et des effets vraiment propres à
laction du régulateur. Le modèle cherche également à identifier les moyens
utilisés par les entreprises pour faire face à la réglementation : des données sont
disponibles pour les dépenses en équipement anti-pollution des entreprises et sur
la quantité deau consommée. Les résultats tendent à démontrer que le contrôle
des émissions polluantes se ferait de façon plus efficace par limposition dune
limite sur les rejets de matières en suspension (MES) que par une limite sur la
demande biochimique en oxygène. Les effets constatés sur la firme dune limite
sur lesMES, proviendraient en partie dune modification dans la production, qui
aurait pour effet de diminuer les émissions. Par contre, les investissements en
équipement anti-pollution, consentis pour atteindre les objectifs de réduction de
DBO, nont eu aucun effet sur les émissions. Limpact des poursuites légales,
des amendes et des enquêtes est impossible à détecter. Parmi les causes possibles
de ces résultats, notons que les sanctions imposées par lOntario aux entreprises
lors dune infraction sur lémission de polluant, durant la période détude, étaient
trop faibles pour influencer de façon mesurable le comportement des entreprises.
Une autre cause pourrait être le fait que les limites démissions sont assez élevées
pour ne pas être contraignantes pour la plupart des firmes de léchantillon.
This paper explores the effects of effluent regulatory activity on
firm behavior in the pulp and paper industry in Ontario. The model uses
instrumental variables to attempt to distinguish between that correlation
between emission limits and emissions coming from regulatory capture and
that coming from true influence on the part of the regulator. The model also
attempts to identify the response channels on the part of the firms: data are
available on reported investments in abatement capital and on firms water
consumption, correlated with output. Estimation results suggest that total
suspended solids (TSS) limits were more effective than biological oxygen
demand (BOD) limits in controlling emissions. Firm responses to TSS limits
were in part through modulating output and these responses lowered
emissions. In contrast, firms reported investing in abatement technology in
response to reductions in BOD limits, but these reported investments had no
discernible impact on emissions. Firm responses to court summons, fines,
and inquiries were impossible to detect. Possible causes of these results are
that penalties for effluent discharge infractions in Ontario during the period
studied were too light to influence firm behavior measurably, and that
emission limits are set high enough not to be binding for most firms in the
sample.
Mots Clés : Environnement, réglementation, pâtes et papier
Keywords : Environment, Regulation, Pulp and Paper
JEL : Q25, Q28
5-day BOD, often also abbreviated to BOD5.U
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1. Introduction
In June 1986 the Ontario provincial government in Canada announced the imminent
introduction of the Municipal Industrial Strategy for Abatement (MISA, finally
introduced in 1990), a piece of legislation which collected under one heading, and
strengthened, a variety of previous abatement initiatives. Emissions regulation in
Ontario has to date been of the command-and-control variety, and MISA remains
within this category. Firms are required to invest in a given best available
technology, for which they receive a certificate of approval, and are then subject
to control orders, which specify performance requirements, in terms of pollution
loading, for the given technology. One objective of MISA was to standardise
these requirements across firms and locations.
For the pulp-and-paper industry, the aim is to control two main measures of water
pollution. The first, biological oxygen demand (BOD) , is not a direct measure ofU
any particular pollutant, but measures the effects on the environment of a number
of water pollutants. The second, total suspended solids (TSS), is a direct measure
of the presence of solid waste emissions in the water supply. The two measures are
often correlated, but constitute separate policy goals and require, to some extent,
different abatement technologies (see, for example, Environment Canada, 1983,
Chapter 13).
From the perspective of economic theory, command-and-control systems like MISA
and its immediate predecessors in Ontario are a second best solution to the problem
of the spillover effects linked to pollution by firms. Even if the socially optimal
level of pollution is achieved, it will not, in general, be achieved at minimum cost
by such systems of legislation. The informational requirement that such a system
imposes on the regulator is in general greater than that imposed by market-driven
legislative systems such as tradable permits or emissions taxes. Moreover,
Milliman and Prince (1989, 1992; see also Marin, 1991) discuss the effects of
different regulatory regimes on technical innovation in pollution abatement, and
conclude that command-and-control mechanisms of the type discussed in this paper
will in general stifle such innovation.
Given that current Canadian legislation is of the command-and-control variety,
however, this paper analyses a complementary question to that referred to in the
preceding paragraph. Are the systems currently in place achieving their own self-
stated aims? For the pulp-and-paper industry during the period of 1985-1989 in
Ontario, we examine the effects on firm behaviour of four measures of regulatory
activity. These are (1) the inspection of factories, (2) the initiation of proceedings
against firms, (3) the imposition of penalties on firms found to have transgressed
2pollution limits, and (4) the creation of new emission limits.
Lanoie and Laplante (1994) have examined stock-market responses to the
announcement of environment-related lawsuits against firms in Canada, the
announcement of fines imposed, and the announcement of investment in new anti-
emissions equipment. They find that the market responds only to the latter two (a
fall of 2 percent in stock-market value typically follows a fine, a fall of 1.2 percent
typically follows the announcement of anti-emissions investment), which represent
realised, rather than potential, costs of regulation to firms. Their results are in
contrast with those of Muoghalu, Robison, and Glascock (1990), in the United
States, who find that the market tends to discount future expected losses on the day
of an announcement of a lawsuit pertaining to environmental offences. Lanoie and
Laplante conclude that the probability of conviction and the expected level of fines
are probably not sufficiently high in Canada to create a market response, since it is
only realised losses which are treated as news by the market. Other possibilities
are that the market does not believe that fines will be imposed or that firms will in
fact make abatement investments. If stock-market valuation is the objective of a
firm, then, we may conclude that the stringency of the regulatory environment may
be insufficient in Canada to create the incentive to reduce emissions significantly,
whereas one would draw the opposite conclusion in the U.S. This provides the
motivation for the empirical analysis of this paper.
Related Work
Magat and Viscusi (1990) estimate two models of the observation of federal BOD-
limits by 77 pulp-and-paper factories in the United States for the period 1982-85.
The first model measures firm response as the level of BOD, and uses ordinary-
least-squares regression to relate this to federal regulatory effort. In the second
model, firm observation or non-observation of Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) BOD-limits is represented, by a logit model, as a response to regulatory
effort. In both models, regulatory effort is measured using dummy variables
indicating inspections in each of the six periods prior to the observation date, and
the data is quarterly. Magat and Viscusi find a high degree of persistence in
emissions levels, ceteris paribus, and that these emissions are responsive to
inspection effort. These two effects combined imply that increased inspection could
have a lasting impact on emissions levels. They then go on to conduct a benefit-cost
analysis of the EPA regulations.
Recently, Laplante and Rilstone (1996) have gained positive results from a similar
model to Magat and Viscusi's applied to monthly data in Québec, Canada. Their
innovation is to model the decision to inspect as a response on the part of the
regulator, and to use the probability-measure of inspection in a period so generated
as the independent variable to which the firm responds. This approach reveals
significant firm responses to the credible (in the sense that it is based on experience)
In the case of Ontario, the inspections are inquiries, only launched if contraventions areUU
suspected, whereas in the Québec data these were sampling inspections.
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threat of inspections. Using Ontario data, however, we failed to reproduce this
result, and indeed there is no sign of firm responses to inspections in this data. This
may be because the threat of high enough fines to have a significant incentive effect
is not credible, or it may be due to differences in the definition of an inspection
between the two provinces.UU
The above studies, while important, focus on only one aspect of the regulatory
framework, namely the frequency of inspections, and its effect on emissions. This
framework comprises many elements in addition to inspections, however: the
severity of limits, the likelihood of summons and fines, the amounts levied, as well
as the complex process of lobbying and consultation that precedes the introduction
of any legislation. A broader quantitative analysis should encompass as many of
these elements as the data permit. For example, limits may become more stringent
without any response on the part of firms if fines are negligible, or if inspections are
too rare. Another possibility that needs to be considered is that regulatory bodies
may be captured: that is, limits set in response to firms' desired levels of output
rather than independent benefit-cost analysis. This paper, to our knowledge,
represents the first attempt to model this process, and to investigate the
effectiveness of the heart of the regulation, the emissions limits themselves.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3
discusses the empirical specifications and results, starting with a simple formulation
where emission limits are postulated to influence emissions directly, and going to
a more realistic formulation where limits can influence emissions through two
important channels: changes in investment and changes in output. As will become
evident, the results from these two different approaches are fairly different. Section
4 concludes.
2. Data
Data are available in Ontario, for 26 pulp and paper mills during the period 1985
to 1989, which allow us to explore the relationships between limits and other
regulatory variables, and firm behavior. The data come mostly from the Ontario
Environment Ministry and the Canadian Pulp and Paper Report, and a summary of
variables is presented in Table 1. (All Tables and Figures will be found at the end
of the article.) See Fearnley (1993) for further details on the compilation of the
dataset.
Effluent emissions are available by firm, by month, for the two forms of pollution
for which the legislation applies, BOD and TSS. Emissions are those reported by
See Kmenta (1986, PP. 618-22) for details of pooled regression techniques.UUU
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the firm to the Ontario Ministry of the Environment, and so we cannot discount the
possibility of false reporting. Conversations with people in the industry suggest that
this is not a serious problem, but strictly speaking we must admit that there is
nothing that we can do about this shortcoming in our data, also present in related
studies.
Regulatory variables are the following. First, the legal limits or guidelines in place
are available (bodlim and tsslim). Next there are cumulative variables taking
positive values when a firm faced a summons, was fined, or was under inquiry
(summons, fine, inquirythese variables take the value 1 at the first instance, 2 at
the second, and so on). They are cumulative in order for the regression results to
be sensitive to lasting effects due to these factors, rather than one-shot reductions
in output or emissions following, say, an inquiry.
Firm response variables are available for both investment and production. Yearly
investment in abatement technology is recorded in the Canadian Pulp and Paper
Report for 15 of the firms in the sample. Accordingly, we restrict our observations
to these 15 firms. These reported investment figures may be subject to two biases.
First, reporting is on a voluntary basis, so there may be incentives for firms not to
report investments for competitive reasons, leading to an underestimation of
investment. Second, in order to illustrate a willingness to environmental lobby
groups or to government, there may be incentives for firms to report investment
which was not undertaken for environmental reasons as such (but which may
nevertheless have an incidental effect on emissionsat issue is not firms honesty
but any bias in our data). This effect would of course offset the first, and it is
impossible to say which bias, if either, might dominate. Nevertheless, we do expect
these figures to be reasonably highly correlated with the true investment figures for
the 15 firms. For production levels we use the firms reported throughput of water
(output), again available from industry statistics. This is not an exact measure of
productionthese figures for individual firms are confidentialbut we expect that
it is sufficiently highly correlated to act as a close proxy.
3. Empirical Results
Exploring the Data with a Simple Specification
Table 2 gives the results from a naive pooled regression of emissions on the
regulatory variables. Fine and summons are lagged by one month to allow forUUU
time to respond on the part of the firms. Columns I-IV relate to BOD, V-VIII to
TSS. To check for robustness we ran the regressions with two sets of dummies,
Where variable names have a time subscript (eg, fine ), this indicates a lag of thatUUUU
t-1
variable.
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first with identifiers for the river basin and the season, second with identifiers for
the region and the month, both times also including subindustry identifiers. These
dummy variables are jointly significant at conventional levels, as indicated by the
F-statistics reported at the bottom of this and later Tables in the paper.
Column I shows a strong relation between the emissions limit and actual emissions,
though the coefficient is less than unity. This coefficient falls by a further 50
percent when past emissions are included on the right hand side, along with the
plants capacity (which is highly significant) and its utilization rate (column II).
Similar results hold for TSS in columns V and VI, but the relationship between
emissions and limits is stronger, though still significantly less than unity.
These regressions are reported simply as a means of exploring the data and
reporting partial correlations. There is clearly no sense in which the results in Table
2 should be considered as any evidence of causality from limits to emissions. If
firms manage to influence the regulators choice of limit, for example, then rising
emissions may well lead to rising limits. This is one possible explanation of results
such as those reported in Table 2. Notice also (column II, for example) that for
BOD at least, summons seem to precede small rises in emissions rather than
falls. The data cannot distinguish between different possible explanations forUUUU
this. One is that firms may relax once a court verdict is announced, not expecting
further regulatory activity for a while. Another is that court verdicts may occur at
times of high emissions lasting more than just one or two months.
Introducing Firm Behavior
One way to approach the problem of inferring causality from correlation is to
examine firms behavior as measured by observable quantities other than the
emissions themselves. Firms may invest in abatement capital, for example, or
reduce output, in response to changes in the stringency of the regulatory
environment they face. Since data exist on firms reported abatement investments,
as well as on the volume of water the firms use (highly correlated with output in the
pulp and paper industry), we may wish to include these variables in an analysis of
the effects of the regulations.
Tables 3A (BOD) and 3B (TSS) add these elements to the naive analysis reported
in Table 2. In each Table columns I and II report coefficients from a regression of
firms reported abatement investment on emissions limits, court summons, fines,
inquiries, investments a year ago, and the capacity utilization to control for the
Fine, summons, and inquiry are lagged by a year in the investment equation to allowUUUUU
time for firms to react and for the investments to be announced in the following years publication.
The lagged dependent variables proved to be necessary to gain consistent estimatesUUUUUU
due to serial correlation among the residuals when these lags were not included.
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business cycle. The 12-month lagged dependent variable is included to controlUUUUU
for persistencesome firms may systematically invest more than others, or past
investment may reduce the need for investment this period. Since one might
reasonably expect investment to respond to changes in the regulatory environment,
both the emissions limit and its year lag are included. A specification in which only
changes in limits mattered would constrain these two coefficients to sum to zero, a
hypothesis which cannot be rejected for the specifications reported in columns I and
II (the difference between the columns again being in the sets of dummy variables
included). For BOD there does seem to be a significant correlation between
changes in the emissions limit and reported investment in abatement capital.
Columns III and IV relate output (measured by water flow through the plant for the
month) to the regulatory variables. There is no evidence of any significant
relationship between output and emissions limits, once the plants capacity is
controlled for. For both BOD and TSS, regulatory inquiries are seen to correspond
with periods of relatively higher output, which is perhaps not surprising.
Do firms changes in behavior, if any, as measured by investment and output,
actually affect emissions? Columns V and VI in Tables 3A and 3B report
coefficients from regressions of emissions on the regulatory variables, but also
including the predicted values ( , ) from the investment (lagged by
a year to allow for time to build) and output equations (columns I-IV in the same
Tables). These predicted values therefore represent the components of investment
and output that were responses to regulatory activity, be it changes in limits,
summons, fines, inquiries, or combinations of these. UUUUUU
Tables 3A and 3B show that the coefficients on the emissions limits remain little
different from their counterparts in Table 2: little of the correlation between limits
and emissions is captured by our measures of firms investment and output
responses. Nor is there any evidence that the investment responses had any effect
on actual emissions. Finally, only for TSS do the firms output responses seem to
have any impact on emissions (Table 3B).
The Full Model
The regressions reported in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that it is difficult to detect firms
responses to environmental regulations through investment or modulation of output.
The importance of being able to distinguish between endogenous and exogenousUUUUUUU
legislation is paramount, as can be seen from two stylized examples. In the first, government legislation
is set completely exogenously, that is, in response to whatever criteria the government deems appropriate
without consulting the firms, and penalties are sufficiently credible that a representative firm pollutes at
exactly the prescribed limit. The second case is the opposite of the firstthe legislation process is
completely captured by firms, who cause limits to be set exactly in accordance with their production
targets, and so of course subsequently observe these limits, and cause penalties to be light. An empirical
observer would see a perfect correspondence between limits and emissions in both cases, and might
erroneously conclude in the second that lowering the limits would cause a corresponding fall in
emissions. But it is firms likely reaction to an exogenous change in legislation which we would like
to estimate in the context of evaluating the effectiveness of the legislation in controlling firm behaviour.
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Columns V and VI of Tables 3A and 3B do describe, however, the same significant
relationship between the limits themselves and emissions, these coefficients being
as high as 0.4 for BOD and 0.6 for TSS. These correlations still pose a problem of
inference. Do they represent firms controlling their emissions in response to
exogenous changes in regulation imposed by government agencies? Or, less
optimistically, do they represent regulatory capture: the tailoring of the limits to
correspond to plants needs, after taking into account their capital investments and
planning decisions?
The possibility of capture of a regulatory body by the agents that it is supposed to
regulate is well known, but this possibility is not reflected in any of the analysis so
far. Such capture is of course just an extreme example of the generic tendency for
regulation not to be entirely exogenous to the phenomenon being regulated.
Environmental limits are usually set following procedures of consultation with those
being regulated, and therefore might be believed to respond not only to exogenous
environmental factors (the costs and benefits of the pollution), but to existing
constraints, lobbying, and so on. Figure 1, at the end of the text, which shows
emissions and limits for a subset of the plants in the sample, is also suggestive of
limits responding to past emissions or firmsrequirements: changes in limits often
seem to follow changes in emissions rather than the opposite (see in particular
Figure 1b). In equation form, we are particularly interested in the limits placed on
emissions, and these may be said to be endogenous to the extent, if at all, that they
are affected by firm actions (e.g., production) and characteristics (e.g., technology,
capacity) and past pollution levels. UUUUUUU
An econometricians answer to the identification problem described here might be
to look for instruments to generate an exogenous component of regulation. One
could then examine whether firms behavior appeared responsive to this exogenous
component.
What might such instruments look like? On one hand, we might consider as
candidates attributes of the plants which affected the seriousness of the
environmental threat posed by emissions into their water sources. These variables
could reasonably be expected to affect government agencies regulatory decisions,
Actually, a Hausman test for the endogeneity of the limits (performed fromUUUUUUUU
specifications III and VII in Table 2, using basins as an instrument) generated t-statistics of 6.5 and 5.0
for BOD and TSS respectively, so we can comfortably reject exogeneity of emission limits in the strict
statistical sense implied by the use of this test.
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but should not affect firms decisions regarding output or investment other than as
responses to these decisions. Locational variables might constitute an example of
such variables. Time dummies or trend terms might also be acceptable if we
thought that the regulators view of the seriousness of emissions were evolving over
time. On the other hand, we might consider attributes of the plants that were
controlled by firms decisions, but only over the medium to long term. Plant
capacity could be considered such an attribute. These variables may also affect the
regulators decisions over limits, but would not be alterable by the firms quickly
enough to be viewed as responses to regulation.UUUUUUUU
The third set of regressions performed for this paper are an attempt to implement
the estimation strategy described in the previous paragraphs. First, the emissions
limits themselves are regressed using ordinary least squares on a trend term
interacted with dummy variables for the plants river basin location, and the trend
term interacted with the plants capacities. These variables constitute the richest
set of instruments we could generate from the data using the logic of the previous
paragraph to define exogeneity. This first stage regression is reported in Table 4
for both BOD and TSS limits.
The second stage of the analysis is to relate firms decisions concerning investment
and output to the predicted values from the first stage regressions, which we
interpret as exogenous regulatory activity. These results are shown in columns I-
IV of Tables 5A and 5B for BOD and TSS respectively. Columns I and II give our
two specifications for the investment equation, relating firms reported abatement
investments to exogenous limits, lagged limits, year lagged summons, fines, and
enquiries, and capacity utilization (again a proxy for the business cycle).
For BOD, in the second specification there is a significant relationship between
exogenous changes in the limit and reported investment and we interpret this as an
interesting indication. Moreover, as in the simple specification of Table 3A, the
hypothesis that the coefficients on the current and lagged limits sum to zero cannot
be rejected at conventional significance levels. The magnitude of these coefficients
is also similar to that in Table 3A. It seems likely that firms, then, are responding
to changes in BOD limits by announcing abatement investments. There is,
however, no evidence that the same is true for TSS limits (Table 5B, columns I and
II).
Columns III and IV in Tables 5A and 5B give the results of the two specifications
of the output equation. These equations are the counterparts of columns III and IV
of Tables 3A and 3B, with the emissions limits replaced with instrumented values.
9For BOD the coefficients in both specifications are significant only at the ten
percent level. For TSS they are significant at all conventional levels. In all
equations there is the increase in output following the imposition of a fine, described
earlier. This could simply reflect firms relaxing more careful policies followed for
the duration of the court case, but this can only be conjectured. The main interest
lies in the change between Tables 3B and 5B for TSS: plants output does seem to
be responsive to exogenous changes in emissions limits in Table 5B, whereas they
were not responsive to the limits themselves in Table 3B. For TSS at least, the
instrumental variables approach sheds new light on firms behavior.
As before, the question remains as to whether we can detect an effect on their actual
emissions of firms responses to exogenous legislation. Columns V (VI) of Tables
5A and 5B report the regressions of emissions on the predicted values from
columns I and III (II and IV), as well as the exogenous component of the limits,
lagged emissions, and the other regulatory variables. For BOD (Table 5A) there
is no evidence that the investment response reported in column II actually affects
emissions at all. A first suggested explanation is that firms announce as abatement
capital projects that might have been taken on for other reasons and that have only
a secondary, perhaps negligible, impact on emissions. This suggestion is in part
inspired from the aggregate picture the data paint (see Figure 2): emissions have not
significantly decreased over the period studied. There are other reasons why firms
may announce investments that do not generate discernible subsequent reductions
in emissions: a second is that firms may be building emissions control equipment
which has not yet come on line. We try to rule out this explanation by using a
reasonably long lag of invest. Thirdly, there may also be expectations of future
regulations, green advertizing, or other factors increasing the cost to firms of
emissions.
For TSS (Table 5B), the hypothesis that the output modulation reported in columns
III and IV does reduce emissions cannot be rejected at the ten percent level.
Exogenous changes in TSS limits do seem to be affecting firms behavior enough
to have a measurable impact on emissions.
Finally, in both the case of BOD and TSS, there is still a highly significant residual
link between the instrumented limit and emissions, after accounting for the
investment and output responses. The coefficient is of a magnitude of about 0.1 or
0.2 for BOD, and about 0.3 for TSS. This represents firms responding to the limits
in ways undetected by our imperfect measurements of investment and output. This
suggests that firms have ways of reducing emissions other than investing or
modulating output: reallocating staff hours towards monitoring, better maintenance
of pollution-control equipment or altering operational details within the plant. It is
also noteworthy that the magnitude of the coefficients of the limit variables in the
emissions equations are much lower than those reported in the naive regressions
of Tables 2 and 3. This fact combined with the Hausman test (footnote 9) rejecting
the exogeneity of the limits suggests that our approach through the full model was
warranted.
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4. Conclusions
Magat and Viscusi (1990) restrict attention to BOD emissions and suggest that
firms reactions to TSS regulations may be similar. Our results suggest that this
may not be the case. For BOD, firms seem to respond by announcing investments,
but these investments do not seem to have much effect on emissions. This in turn
suggests that policy may have placed undue emphasis on the abatement technology
itself (see the first paragraph of the introduction) rather than its results. Portney
(1990, page 5), in the context of United States environmental regulation, observed:
One finding is that much more attention has been devoted
to ensuring that polluters get pollution equipment in place than to
seeing that it is operated correctly.
In contrast, changes in TSS limits seem to affect firms short term output decisions,
and the firms adjustments are reflected in lower emissions.
The overall impression that the results give, of a relative lack of impact on
emissions, is reinforced by the graphs of industry wide aggregates and ratios shown
in Figure 2. Between 1985 and 1989, BOD and TSS emissions per unit of output
remained relatively flat, as did output itself. Aggregate limits fell slowly over this
period, but exceeded emissions, which fluctuated but showed no strong downward
trend.
Previous work has drawn attention to the fact that United States environmental
penalties are more severe than those in Canada, and that this may explain the
perceived differences in firms responses to legislation between the two countries.
This lack of severity in Ontario may also explain the weakness of effect of the
legislative variables used in this paper: emissions tend to increase after a fine is
announced, for example. In particular, the lack of response of emissions to inquiries
is in contrast with Magat and Viscusis (1990) results for the United States. The
results in general are consonant with those in Lanoie and Laplante (1994), who use
stock market data to suggest that expected penalties associated with environmental
infractions in Canada are not sufficiently severe to have a significant impact on firm
behavior. An alternative explanation is that many of the firms were in compliance
by a sufficiently large margin that changes in limits would not be likely to modify
their behavior: more than three-quarters of the observations in the sample were in
compliance.
On a methodological level, this paper addresses empirical issues that previous work
in the economics of environmental regulation has not. First, it is necessary to
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distinguish between exogenous changes in regulations (roughly speaking, those
following from considerations of social costs and benefits) and endogenous changes
in regulations (roughly speaking, those following from firms past emissions or
ability to abate). Second, it is possible to distinguish empirically between different
modes of response on the part of firms. The data are imperfect, and the
implementation of the empirical methodology can only be as successful as the data
are accurate, but we hope that future work will be able to build on the methods used
here. The ability to discern distinct firm responses to true regulator influence may
in turn improve regulators ability to improve environmental business law.
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Table 1 : Summary of Variables
Name Definition/Units Mean St. Dev. Source
BOD (emissions) kg/day over 30 days 11029 12180 Ontario Environment Min
TSS (emissions) kg/day over 30 days 3777 3165 Ontario Environment Min
BODlim kg/day over 30 days 18741 20417 Ontario Environment Min
TSSlim kg/day over 30 days 6002 4922 Ontario Environment Min
Invest Can. $ '000 p.a. 606 1179 Pulp and Paper Canada
Output m of water per month 63104 58436 Ontario Environment Min3
Summons 1 at 1st, 2 at 2nd... 0.551 1.047 Ontario Environment Min
Fine 1 at 1st, 2 at 2nd... 0.393 0.977 Ontario Environment Min
Inquiry 1 at 1st, 2 at 2nd... 4.401 6.998 Ontario Environment Min
Capa Tons/month 58339 130730 Pulp and Paper Canada
Utilisation Industry-wide Percent 0.957 0.014 Statistics Canada cat. 14-
Basin1-5 Indicator Ontario Environment Mina
Region1-3 Indicator Ontario Environment Minb
Season1-3 Indicatorc
Month1-11 Indicatord
Subind1-3 Indicator Ontario Environment Mine
Time Period of observation. 36.5 13.863
Notes : Default: Ottawa River, 1: Hudson Bay, 2: Lake Superior, 3: Lake Huron, 4: Lake Ontario, 5: St. Lawrencea
Default: Centre-west, 1: Northeast, 2: Northwest, 3: Southeastb
Default: autumn (Sep-Oct-Nov), 1: winter (Dec-Jan-Feb), 2: spring (Mar-Apr-May), 3: summer (Jun-Jul-Aug)c
Default: Decemberd
Default: Deinking/board/fine papers/tissue, 1: Kraft, 2: Sulphite-mechanical, 3: Corrugatinge
Report on Industrial Direct Discharges in Ontario (1985-89)f
Table 2 : POLLUTION EMISSIONS (BOD and TSS)
Coefficients/standard errors
I II III IV V VI VII
BODLIM 0.460** 0.230** 0.509** 0.295**
0.031 0.044 0.025 0.035
TSSLIM 0.645** 0.469** 0.533**
0.053 0.061 0.046
SUMMONS 240 -61.0 -t-1 295** 418** 355* -151* -176*
123 167 167 76.7 81.3152 66.4
FINE 171 317 186 341 -96.7 -76.3 -67.6 -t-1
131 181 164 186 83.2 73.1 89.5
INQUIRY -15.8 -5.21 13.593 29.537 8.97 5.54 4.71
14.3 21.2 19.97 22.87 6.89 5.68 7.61
BOD 0.203t-12
0.033
0.200**
0.032
TSSt-12 0.050* 0.
0.024 0
CAPACITY 0.0226** 0.0171** 0.0077** 0.
0.0054 0.0058 0.0014 0
UTILIZATION 757 714 -1567 -
3548 3874 1267
dummies
basins T T T T
regions T T T
seasons T T T T
months T T T
subind T T T T T T T
F 15.0 12.5 15.1 12.8 15.3 14.1 15.8
r-square 0.80 0.80 0.71 0.75 0.81 0.85 0.81
obs 720 720 720 720 720 720 720
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Table 3A : REACTION EQUATIONS - BOD
Coefficients/standard errors
I II III IV V V
DEPVAR INVEST INVEST OUTPUT OUTPUT BOD Ba
BODLIM 0.0214-0.0129** -0.0137** 0.283* 0.268** 0.4
0.0040 0.0047 0.136 0.045 0.0.1481
BODLIM 0.0117t-12 0.0133**
0.0051 0.0065
INVEST -0.0228 -0.0466t-12
0.0141
0.0272
 -170 42
252 1
-18.7 8
73.1 92
SUMMONS 10.6 34.7t-12
20.8 38.3
SUMMONS -186 -211 2t-1
573 692 1
263*
115
FINE 1.48 13.4t-12
22.2 43.6
I II III IV V V
16
FINE 936 159 1t-1
604 130 1
1701*
745
INQUIRY 1.42 6.04t-12
3.90 8.28
INQUIRY -8.55 1207** 268**
70.3 94.4 12.2 2
BODt-12 0.222** 0.1
0.032 0.
CAPACITY 0.258** 0.224**
0.024 0.020
UTILIZATION -60.4 -197 9825 10212
146 657 11930 18410
dummies
basins T T T
regions T T
seasons T T T
months T T
subind T T T T T
F 14.0 13.1 21.0 18.1 13.8 13
r-square 0.05 0.06 0.94 0.86 0.84 0
obs 720 720 720 720 720 7
DEPVAR: Dependent variablea
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Table 3B : REACTION EQUATIONS - TSS
Coefficients/standard errors
I II III IV V V
DEPVAR INVEST INVEST OUTPUT OUTPUT TSS T
TSSLIM -0.0108 0.0119 0.631** 0.5
0.0192 0.0234 0.0513 0.
0.366 0.456
0.301 0.373
TSSLIM -0.0197 -0.268t-12
0.0214 0.030
INVEST -0.0329 -0.0519t-12
0.0168 0.0281
58.7 1
137 1
149** 21
28.7 35
SUMMONS 12.4 39.8t-12
21.7 38.6
SUMMONS 21.5 -75.2 24.6 -5t-1
592 707 55.8 77
FINE 2.02 15.1t-12
23.1 43.5
I II III IV V V
18
FINE 1029 -67.1t-1
628 60.4
1702* -1
766 80
INQUIRY 1.61 6.13t-12
4.07 8.49
INQUIRY 3.19 -6187** 198*
66.4 86.9 4.56 8
TSS 0.t-12 0.0676**
0.0243 0.
CAPACITY 0.253** 0.245**
0.018 0.018
UTILIZATION -50.2 -174 10826 5896
144 652 12230 18300
dummies
basins T T T
regions T T
seasons T T T
months T T
subind T T T T T
F 11.7 12.3 17.9 16.2 14.4 15
r-square 0.04 0.05 0.93 0.87 0.88 0
obs 720 720 720 720 720 7
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Table 4 : First Stage Regression of Emissions Limits
BOD Std Error TSS Std Erro
PERIOD 35.9 6.71-339** -77.7**
CAPA*BASIN1 1.96 0.4424.62** 3.46**
CAPA*BASIN2 0.003 0.00050.110** 0.0187**
CAPA*BASIN3 -0.00972 0.0129 0.0024-0.0288**
CAPA*BASIN4 0.0040 0.00080.0468** 0.0180**
CAPA*BASIN5 7.23 1.3628.6** 29.6**
PERIOD*BASIN1 66.9 12.5460** 50.8**
PERIOD*BASIN2 32.7 6.11670** 125**
PERIOD*BASIN3 39.3 7.3592.6** 226**
PERIOD*BASIN4 27.1 31.7 5.44 5.93
PERIOD*BASIN5 87.7 16.4229** 77.7**
CONSTANT 914 17115348** 3963**
r-square 0.86 0.92
obs 720 720
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Table 5A : REACTION EQUATIONS with ENDOGENOUS LIMITS - BOD
Coefficients/standard errors
I II III IV V V
DEPVAR INVEST INVEST OUTPUT OUTPUT BOD B
-0.00254
0.00244
-0.0198** 0.155* 0.232* 0.0827** 0.2
0.0059 0.072 0.099 0.0252 0.
BODLIM 0.00336t-12
0.00450
0.0166*
0.0078
INVEST -0.0244 -0.0440t-12
0.0154 0.0282
-75.9 82
286 1
-100
67.1
24
98
SUMMONS 10.8 29.7t-12
22.4 40.0
SUMMONS 247 -34.4t-1
567 683
467** 63
146 1
FINE 0.800 6.05t-12
23.8 46.0
I II III IV V V
21
FINEt-1 1256* 1923** 418** 42
613 737 153 1
INQUIRY 0.878 1.07t-12
4.17 8.83
INQUIRY -5.74133** 178* 67
47.7 70.5 1823.9
BODt-12 0.280** 0.2
0.031 0.
CAPACITY 0.242** 0.224**
0.019 0.019
UTILIZATION 23.5 -135 9656 4975
164 670 11690 17050
dummies
basins T T T
regions T T
seasons T T T
months T T
subind T T T T T
F 10.7 11.3 20.6 17.9 14.3 14
r-square 0.04 0.07 0.94 0.90 0.75 0
obs 720 720 720 720 720 7
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Table 5B : REACTION EQUATIONS with ENDOGENOUS LIMITS - TSS
Coefficients/standard errors
I II III IV V V
DEPVAR INVEST INVEST OUTPUT OUTPUT TSS T
0.00311 0.0260
0.00857
0.0238
0.816** 1.34** 0.301** 0.3
0.272 0.38 0.059 0.
TSSLIM -0.0263 -0.0237t-12
0.0188 0.0307
INVEST -0.0281 -0.0469t-12
0.0158 0.0269
75.9 1
132 1
72.0* 99
32.2 41
SUMMONS 12.4 42.8t-12
20.7 37.0
SUMMONS 238 -122 -99.4 -t-1
556 674 89.2 9
FINE 2.30 18.5t-12
22.0 42.2
I II III IV V V
23
FINE -48.5 12t-1 1369* 2013**
608 733 91.6 1
INQUIRY 1.75 6.19t-12
3.97 7.92
INQUIRY 0.187 -2151** 204**
46.9 71.4 9.82 9
TSSt-12 0.0764** 0.07
0.0256
0.0
CAPACITY 0.245** 0.231**
0.018 0.016
UTILIZATION -81.5 69.7 8393 2868
136 698 11630 17540
dummies
basins T T T
regions T T
seasons T T T
months T T
subind T T T T T
F 10.1 11.2 22.4 19.0 15.6 15
r-square 0.04 0.06 0.94 0.90 0.57 0
obs 720 720 720 720 720 7
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Figure 1 : Limits and Emissions for Four Mills
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Figure 2 : Sample Aggregate Emissions, Output, and Limits
Vous pouvez consulter la liste complète des publications du CIRANO et les publications%
elles-mêmes sur notre site World Wide Web à l'adresse suivante :
http://www.cirano.umontreal.ca/publication/page1.html
Liste des publications au CIRANO %
Cahiers CIRANO / CIRANO Papers (ISSN 1198-8169)
96c-1 Peut-on créer des emplois en réglementant le temps de travail ? / par Robert
Lacroix
95c-2 Anomalies de marché et sélection des titres au Canada / par Richard Guay, Jean-
François L'Her et Jean-Marc Suret
95c-1 La réglementation incitative / par Marcel Boyer
94c-3 L'importance relative des gouvernements : causes, conséquences et organisations
alternative / par Claude Montmarquette
94c-2 Commercial Bankruptcy and Financial Reorganization in Canada / par Jocelyn
Martel
94c-1 Faire ou faire faire : La perspective de l'économie des organisations / par Michel
Patry
Série Scientifique / Scientific Series (ISSN 1198-8177)
96s-24 Nonparametric Estimation of American Options Exercise Boundaries and Call
Prices / Mark Broadie, Jérôme Detemple, Eric Ghysels, Olivier
Torrès
96s-23 Asymmetry in Cournot Duopoly / Lars-Hendrik Röller, Bernard Sinclair-
Desgagné
96s-22 ShouldWeAbolish Chapter 11? Evidence from Canada / Timothy C.G. Fisher,
Jocelyn Martel
96s-21 Environmental Auditing in Management Systems and Public Policy / Bernard
Sinclair-Desgagné, H. Landis Gabel
96s-20 Arbitrage-Based Pricing When Volatility Is Stochastic / Peter Bossaert, Eric
Ghysels, Christian Gouriéroux
96s-19 Kernel Autocorrelogram for Time Deformed Processes / Eric Ghysels, Christian
Gouriéroux, Joanna Jasiak
96s-18 A Semi-Parametric Factor Model for Interest Rates / Eric Ghysels, Serena Ng
96s-17 Recent Advances in Numerical Methods for Pricing Derivative Securities /
Mark Broadie, Jérôme Detemple
96s-16 American Options on Dividend-Paying Assets / Mark Broadie, Jérôme
Detemple
96s-15 Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria in a Class of Resource Games / Gerhard Sorger
96s-14 Ex Ante Incentives and Ex Post Flexibility / Marcel Boyer et Jacques Robert
96s-13 Monitoring New Technological Developments in the Electricity Industry : An
International Perspective / Louis A. Lefebvre, Élisabeth Lefebvre et
Lise Préfontaine
96s-12 Model Error in Contingent Claim Models Dynamic Evaluation / Eric Jacquier
et Robert Jarrow
